Malicious botnet survivability mechanism evolution forecasting by means of a genetic algorithm by Goranin, Nikolaj et al.
© Vilniaus Gedimino technikos universitetas 
http://www.mla.vgtu.lt13
MOKSLAS – LIETUVOS ATEITIS 
SCIENCE – FUTURE OF LITHUANIA
Sistemų inžinerija, kompiuterių technologija T 120 Elektronika ir elektrotechnika 
System Engineering, Computer Technology T 120 Electronics and Electrical Engineering
ISSN 2029-2341 print / ISSN 2029-2252 online
2012 4(1): 13–19 doi:10.3846/mla.2012.04
Malicious Botnet survivaBility MechanisM evolution Forecasting 
By Means oF a genetic algorithM
nikolaj goranin1, Antanas Čenys2, Jonas Juknius3
1, 2Vilnius Gediminas Technical University 
3The Communications Regulatory Authority of the Republic of Lithuania, Vilnius Gediminas Technical University 
E-mails: 1nikolaj.goranin@vgtu.lt; 2antanas.cenys@vgtu.lt; 3jjj@cert.lt
abstract. Botnets are considered to be among the most dangerous modern malware types and the biggest current threats to 
global IT infrastructure. Botnets are rapidly evolving, and therefore forecasting their survivability strategies is important for the 
development of countermeasure techniques. The article propose the botnet-oriented genetic algorithm based model framework, 
which aimed at forecasting botnet survivability mechanisms. The model may be used as a framework for forecasting the evolu-
tion of other characteristics. The efficiency of different survivability mechanisms is evaluated by applying the proposed fitness 
function. The model application area also covers scientific botnet research and modelling tasks.
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Introduction
The term “bot” describes a remote control program loaded 
on a computer usually after a successful invasion (Brand 
et al. 2009) that is used for malicious purposes (Provos, 
Holz 2007) often against the intentions of computer owners 
and without their knowledge (Lee et al. 2007). A botnet is 
a network of computers on which a bot has been instal-
led and is usually managed remotely from a Command & 
Control (C&C) server. The main purpose of botnets is to 
use infected computers for fraudulent activities (Barroso 
2007): information stealing (Barford, Yegneswaran 2005), 
spam distribution, performing DDoS attacks (Banks, Stytz 
2008; Lee et al. 2007) which due to botnet development 
have developed from theoretical to real informational we-
apons (Fultz 2008), click fraud, key cracking, phishing, 
new malware distribution to the wild (Lee et al. 2007), 
pirated media distribution and other tasks (Karasaridis et al. 
2007). Botnets are managed by a criminal or a group of 
criminals (Barroso 2007) called botmasters or botherders 
(Banks, Stytz 2008).
It is widely accepted that botnets pose one of the most 
significant and steadily increasing threats to the Internet 
with devastating consequences (Barroso 2007; Rajab et al. 
2007). Bot technology has accelerated in its development 
in the last few years (Banks, Stytz 2008). The reason for 
this change is a significant shift in motivation for malicio-
us activity: from vandalism and recognition in the hacker 
community to attacks and intrusions for financial gain. This 
shift has been marked by the growing sophistication of the 
tools and methods used for conducting attacks (Barford, 
Yegneswaran 2005; Juknius, Cenys 2009). Bot armies are 
effective for two reasons: they can execute multiple overt 
actions against targets and, alternatively, provide multi-
ple coordinated and covert listening points within targeted 
networks and computer systems (Banks, Stytz 2008).
It is difficult to measure the extent of damage caused 
on the Internet by botnets, but the damage done is signi-
ficant (Grizzard et al. 2007). (Rajab et al. 2007) find that 
a major contributor of unwanted Internet traffic – 27% of 
all malicious connection attempts – can be directly attri-
buted to botnet-related spreading activity. The estimation 
of the botnet size vary considerably, especially due to the 
fact that hackers frequently attack large numbers of easy-
to-compromise home computers (Wash 2008), the num-
ber of which cannot be measured accurately (Zhuge et al. 
2007). For example, between 1 July and 31 December 2007, 
Symantec observed an average of 61,940 active bot-infec-
ted computers per day, a 17% increase from the previous 
reporting period (Symantec… 2008); (Zhuge et al. 2007) 
state that they tracked 3 290 IRC-based botnets during the 
measurement period between June 2006 and June 2007 
and in total observed about 700 700 distinct IP addresses. 
The biggest observed botnet they tracked controlled more 
than 50 000 hosts. According to ENISA report (Barroso 
2007), each botnet has an average of 20 000 compromised 
computers (bots): some C&C servers manage only a few in-
fected computers while the large ones manage thousands of 
bots. Our measurements performed at the Communications 
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Regulatory Authority of the Republic of Lithuania have 
shown the following dynamics: in 2007, the total number 
of unique bots in Lithuania was equal to 3 917, in 2008 – 
1 502 (due to effective measures taken against centralized 
botnets) and 10 690 for only three first months of 2009. 
The trend toward economic motivation is likely to catalyze 
the development of new capabilities in the botnet code ma-
king the task of securing networks against this threat much 
more difficult (Barford, Yegneswaran 2005). According to 
(Barroso 2007), the objective of criminals using botnets 
will be twofold: to increase the number of infected com-
puters and a growth in stability and survivability applying 
different methods. An important point is to outline and 
predict botnet mechanisms for the future since this allows 
researchers to develop countermeasures against these kinds 
of botnets before they appear in the wild (Starnberger et al. 
2008). The article proposes the genetic algorithm (GA) 
based malware strategy forecasting model for predicting 
techniques the future botnets will use for improving their 
survivability mechanisms.
Botnet Analysis
Botnets possess the characteristics of a virus, a worm and 
a Trojan (Banks, Stytz 2008). They are different from tra-
ditional discrete infections as they act as a coordinated at-
tacking group (Dagon et al. 2005). The overall architecture 
and implementation of botnets is complex and is evolving 
toward the use of common software engineering techniques 
such as modularity (Barford, Yegneswaran 2005).
Botnets usually do not rely on a single method of 
propagation but make use of a combined approach. The 
methods include scanning for vulnerable hosts (Li et al. 
2007), network shares, spam or unsolicited e-mail, P2P 
(Peer-to-peer), (Barroso 2007), net news, web blogs, other 
WEB resources (Dagon et al. 2005), social engineering via 
an enticement ‘lure’ e-mail, browser exploit and malicio-
us file download, (Barroso 2007), via instant messenger 
(Dittrich, D., Dittrich, S. 2002), etc. Separate botnet parts 
can use different propagation methods. In case botnet uses 
scanning for the search of vulnerable hosts (Li et al. 2007), 
three types of scanning can be separated: localized scanning 
(each bot chooses scanning range based on its own IP pre-
fixes), targeted scanning (bot master specifies a particular IP 
prefix for bots to scan) and uniform scanning (scanning the 
whole Internet). Botnet creators are forced to use different 
obfuscation and deception methods for protecting botnets. 
The examples of the advanced modern botnet rely on a wide 
range of complex methods such as extremely resilient ran-
dom topologies, traffic anonymization (Dagon et al. 2005), 
load balancing, reverse proxies for C&C servers, fast-flux 
services, Rock Phish (Barroso 2007), the encrypted/obfus-
cated control channel (Wang et al. 2007) and many others 
(Dagon et al. 2005; Wang et al. 2007). The recent trend 
is toward smaller botnets with only several hundred to se-
veral thousand zombies since big botnets are bad from the 
standpoint of manageability and the wider availability of 
broadband access makes smaller botnets as capable as the 
larger botnets earlier (Vogt et al. 2007).
Most botnets that appeared prior to 2005 (Canavan 
2005) had common centralized architecture, i.e. the bots in 
the botnet were connected directly to C&C servers (Wang 
et al. 2007) and were based on IRC due to its ability to 
scale to thousands of clients easily (Karasaridis et al. 2007).
According to ENISA report (Barroso 2007), IRC is 
still being used by some botnets, but HTTP is now more 
widespread, since it is even easier to implement and can 
be hidden in normal user web navigation traffic. One of 
the most typical and widespread IRC botnets is the Agobot 
family, which is among the most widespread in the num-
ber of variants created according to (Gordon 2004). The 
(Gordon 2004) paper presents a detailed overview of the 
history of the Agobot family and changes in the functionali-
ty and description of them. Agobot is created on a modular 
basis and mainly affects computers running MS Windows 
platform. Bot development kit is distributed under GNU 
GPL license (Gordon 2004). Agobot can exploit many well-
known OS vulnerabilities and back doors left by other vi-
ruses (Barford, Yegneswaran 2005). Exploits and delivery 
functions are separated. Once the first step exploits succeed, 
it opens a shell on the remote host to download bot binary 
encoded to avoid network-based signature detection. The 
bot has the module of testing for debuggers and VMWare 
once it is installed. In case it detects VMWare, it stops 
running (Zhaosheng et al. 2002).
Considering the above mentioned weaknesses inhe-
rent to the centralized architecture of C&C botnets, it is 
a natural strategy for botmasters to design a peer-to-peer 
(P2P) control mechanism into their botnets (Wang et al. 
2007). In P2P architecture, there is no centralized point 
for C&C (Grizzard et al. 2007). Nodes in the P2P network 
act as both clients and servers in a way that there is no 
centralized coordination point that can be incapacitated. If 
the nodes in the network are taken offline, the gaps in the 
network are closed and the network continues to operate 
under control of the botmaster. One more problem posed by 
P2P botnets to security specialists is difficulty in estimating 
the size of the P2P botnet (Dittrich, D., Dittrich, S. 2002). 
The best known decentralized botnet is the STORM bo-
tnet. SANS Institute (Sans… 2008) has named the STORM 
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botnet as the biggest security issue of the year 2008. There 
are no significant differences from IRC botnets in mali-
cious functionality; however, it differs in resistance and 
self-protection mechanisms. The P2P-based botnet STORM 
based on the Kademlia (eDonkey) algorithm so that it can 
contact its peer list if they are online (Mukamurenzi 2008) 
is very hard to trace and shut down, because the botnet has 
robust network connectivity, uses encryption and controls 
traffic dispersion. Each bot influences only a small part of 
the botnet, and upgrade/recovery is accomplished easily 
by its botmaster (Zhang 2008). It has aggressive defences 
(attacks anyone (DDoS) who tries to analyse it or reverse 
engineer it) and uses clique architecture where each clique 
has its own 40-bit encryption key. There are no file exchan-
ges between infected hosts that make it difficult to track. 
STORM uses fast-flux service networks. The DNS records 
of the website changes every few minutes (Barroso 2007; 
Mukamurenzi 2008).
Prior and Related Work
The first epidemiological model for computer virus 
propagation was proposed by (Kephart, White 1991). 
Epidemiological models abstract from the individuals and 
consider them the units of a population. Each unit can only 
belong to a limited number of states (Susceptible-Infected-
Recovered state chain in the SIR model and Susceptible-
Infected-Susceptible in SIS).
The Random Constant Spread (RCS) model (Staniford 
et al. 2002) was developed using empirical data derived 
from the outbreak of the CodeRed worm. As (Nazario 2004) 
states, although more complicated models can be derived, 
most network worms will follow this trend. (Chen et al. 
2003) propose the AAWP discrete time model in the hope 
to better capture the discrete time behaviour of a worm. 
However, according to (Serazzi, Zanero 2004), a conti-
nuous model is appropriate for large scale models and the 
benefits of using a discrete time model seem to be very 
limited. On the other hand, (Serazzi, Zanero 2004) propo-
se a sophisticated compartment based model treating the 
Internet as the interconnection of autonomous systems, i. e. 
subnetworks. Interconnections are called “bottlenecks”. The 
model assumes that inside a single autonomous system the 
worm propagates unhindered, following the RCS model. 
(Zou et al. 2002) propose a two-factor propagation model 
that is more precise in modelling the satiation phase taking 
into consideration human countermeasures, decreased scan 
and infection rate due to a large amount of scan-traffic. 
The same authors have also published an article on model-
ling worm propagation under dynamic quarantine defence 
(Zou et al. 2003) and evaluated the effectiveness of several 
existing and perspective worm propagation strategies (Zou 
et al. 2005).
In a technical report (Zou et al. 2004), the authors 
described a model of e-mail worm propagation. Malware 
propagation in Gnutella type P2P networks was described 
in (Ramachandran, Sikdar 2006). An analytical model that 
emulates the mechanics of the decentralized Gnutella type 
network was formulated and the study of malware spread on 
such networks was performed. The authors of (Ruitenbeek 
et al. 2007) simulate virus propagation using parameterized 
stochastic models for a network of mobile phones created 
with the help of Möbius tool.
In (Goranin, Cenys 2008), we have proposed the GA 
based model dedicated to forecasting the evolution of pro-
pagation techniques used by the Internet worms at the initial 
propagation phase. The effect of countermeasures on the 
evolution of the Internet worm was discussed in (Goranin, 
Cenys 2009). A rather similar concept was proposed almost 
one year later in (Noreen et al. 2009).
Several botnet-oriented models were put forward; 
nevertheless, they all concentrate on the tasks other than 
forecasting botnet evolution. (Lelarge 2002) introduces 
an economic approach to malware epidemic modelling 
(including botnets). (Li et al. 2009) model botnet-related 
cybercrimes as a result of profit-maximizing decision-
making from the perspectives of both botnet masters and 
renters/attackers. From this economic model, they derive 
an effective rental size and an optimal botnet size. (Fultz 
2008) describes distributed attacks organized with the help 
of botnets as economic security games. (Banks, Stytz 2008) 
use the epidemiological model as a basis for botnet mo-
delling. In (Zou et al. 2008), the authors suggest using the 
botnet propagation model via vulnerability exploitation 
and notice some similarities of bot and worm propagation. 
Botnet propagation modelling using time zones was pro-
posed in (Dagon et al. 2006). The authors of (Ruitenbeek, 
Sanders 2008) developed a stochastic model of P2P botnet 
formation to provide insight on possible defence tactics 
and examine how different factors impact the growth of 
the botnet.
Botnet Strategy Evolution Forecasting Model
As stated in (Banks, Stytz 2008), the development of botnet 
simulation and modelling capabilities requires advances in 
improving the understanding of botnet technologies and the 
development of standards that support the simulation of bot 
army operations. However, these tasks are complex for a 
variety of reasons such as a wide variety of botnets and 
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their manner of propagation, challenge posed by modelling 
the amount of time and the patterns of their infestation. 
Thus, the GA approach to modelling botnets is extremely 
efficient due to its ability to solve complex problems with 
large solution space. GA (Holland 1975) simulates natural 
selection by means of the repeatedly evolving population 
of solutions (botnet survivability strategies in our case), and 
therefore may be used for predicting and modelling possible 
future survivability strategies (combination of methods and 
techniques used by malware). While creating the GA based 
model, there are two main tasks to be solved: first, it is the 
correct selection of chromosomes and genes representing 
the proposed solution; second, the creation of the fitness 
equation (or fitness evaluation criteria such as statistical 
evaluation etc.) that evaluates the fitness of the solution 
(single chromosome) generated during evolution and selects 
the most appropriate solutions according to the selection 
strategy. It is obvious that solution representation is highly 
dependent on the analyzed problem and its complexity, 
whereas the fitness function – on the evaluated criteria.
GA consists of initialization, selection and evolution 
stages. During the initialization stage, the initial population 
of strategies is generated. Each strategy is represented as a 
chromosome. The initial population of strategies is genera-
ted on a random basis. At the selection stage, the strategies 
are selected through the fitness-based process. In case ter-
mination condition is not met, evolutionary mechanisms are 
started. In case termination condition is reached (number of 
generations or evolution stagnation), algorithm execution is 
ended. Otherwise – evolutionary mechanisms are activated. 
The crossover point for each pair of parents is selected 
randomly and defines the gene after which the crossover 
operation is performed. The mutation operator defines the 
gene of a newly generated individual that should change 
the value from current to any other random value from 
the range of possible gene values. Fitness proportionate 
selection is used for parent selection.
Strategy Representation
The behaviouristic characteristics of botnets (propagation 
vectors, communication channels and hierarchy, functio-
nality, defence techniques) can be described as a botnet 
strategy. In GA modelling, each strategy is represented as 
a chromosome. Botnets vary from other malware types in 
complexity. Many of them change behaviour at different 
periods of their existence. Thus, the creation of a univer-
sal representational chromosome is a complex task. The 
representation of the proposed strategy via chromosomes 
is provided in Table.
We suggest using a reference system for gene activation and 
method definition (selection from maximum 9 methods or 
gene deactivation). In Table, the gene (fixed-length num-
ber – 10 positions) in the “Gene code” column activates 
one or several methods from the reference database (sam-
ples are provided in the “Reference database (or sample)” 
column). “0” marks references to the methods that do not 
exist, whereas other digits (1–9) point to the references 
to the database. The number of non-zero digits shows the 
number of the methods activated. No the same non-zero 
digits in one gene can appear (e.g. 4510000700 is “OK”, 
but 4550000700 is not). This check is performed during 
the initial population generation phase. The non-zero digit 
order is not important (in case the gene is 4510000700, 
methods 4, 5, 1 and 7 are active). The 0000000000 gene 
means that it is not active and no methods are used. If the 
gene is compulsory for the botnet but is not active, such 
an individual (strategy) will be simply eliminated by the 
evolutionary selection process. This check is performed at 


















































1) Scan – Random;




3)  Scan – Random addresses 
from the networks 








Each method may use 
from 1 to 9 exploits. 
The necessary number 
of exploits with 
referencing ex ploi ting 
probability is selected 
from the list of 
exploits. Limita tions: 
exploits used for one 


































me cha nism uses UDP 
protocol for exploiting 
body transfer, 
connection oriented ~ 
TCP. Im por tant in case 
of scan. “Connection 

































2)  *nix (Unix, Solaris, Linux)
3) Win9x





9) WEB application exploit
All exploits used 
should run on a single 
platform. Different 
methods may run on 
different OS. WEB 































Defines the number of 
exploits used by each method
A random number of 
exploits used by each 


































1)  Central – 1 management 
host (further MH)
2)  Central – 1 MH – botnet 
is split
3)  Central – several (2–9) 
MH – independent
4)  Central – several (2–9) 
MH – load balancing
5)  Central – several (2–9) 
MH hosts – fast-flux 
protection
6)  Central – several 
(2–9) MH – fast-flux 
protection – load 
balancing
7)  Belongs to several botnets 
(2–9) with central MH
8) Decentralized – P2P
9)  Decentralized – P2P and 
fast-lux technology
In this gene, only the 
first number out of 10 
has sense and defines 





















































7)  Remote update and 
deinstallation of the 
installed bot
8) Botnet rental tools
9) Botnet ease-of-use
This list is not 
complete since it is 
limited to the number 
of 9, which is selected 












































1)  Blocking Firewall / 
Antivirus processes
2)  Blocking Antivirus 
Updates
3) Blocking OS updates
4)  Deinstallation imitation, if 
detected by Antivirus
5) Imitation of usefulness
6) Period of inactivity
7) Low activity
8)  De-installation if 
“honeypot” is suspected
9) Social engineering
This list is not 
complete since it is 
limited to the number 
of 9, which is selected 
for the reason of 
simplicity
Definition of Botnet Stability  
and Evolution Trends
For botmasters, it is necessary to insure that the botnet will 
be stable (functional, manageable and of a relatively fixed 
size) for time period T necessary to fulfil botmasters tasks. 
T is task dependant survivability mechanisms activated in 
the botnet to insure the necessary stability level in each 
case will be different.
Botnet stability may be discussed in two aspects: hie-
rarchy stability insuring the overall functionality and stabi-
lity of the botnets (e.g. if C&C is blocked, the bots become 
useless even if not detected by antivirus programs) and the 
stability of botnet nodes – bots, i.e. probability that the bot 
will not be removed from the botnet network by different 
countermeasures. To insure stability, botnet creators imple-
ment different survivability (or protection) mechanisms.
In case we want to evaluate botnet evolution only 
in of survivability, we can say that hierarchy stability is 
directly proportional to the number of C&C used and cor-
responding protection mechanisms and can be calculated 
according to Equation 1. GA modelling is not needed since 
the evolution trend is clear and the number of possible 
trends is very limited.
 




where N – the number of C&C; T – time interval necessary 
for the botnet to remain stable; tCC_block – the average time 
needed for botnet fighters to block the C&C of a specific 
hierarchy (hierarchy_Nr) using or not using some self-
protection measures. In reality, the decision of the botnet 
creator would be based on an economic evaluation of hie-
rarchy implementation or realization complexity.
Another botnet stability part – bot or node stability 
- has much more possible survivability mechanisms com-
binations, dependent on a variety of functions the bot has 
to perform and evolution trends are not so clear. That is 
why we propose applying the GA model and evaluation 
of survivability mechanism via the fitness-based process.
Fitness Function and Model Limitations
Considering the definition, the fitness function is a particu-
lar type of an objective function that quantifies the optimali-
ty of a solution so that a particular individual may be ranked 
against the other individuals. In our case, we propose the 
fitness function that allows the evaluation of survivability 
mechanism used by the botnet nodes.
We state that bot survivability can be evaluated by the 
use of probabilistic and time consumption parameters for 
the methods activated by genes for each of the strategies:
 ( )( )
9
1
( ) 1 _i
i
F S k p self protect
=
= ⋅ −∏ , (2)
where F – the fitness function; S – botnet strategy being 
evaluated; pi – probability that the ith method (self protect) 
End of Table 
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will protect the botnet node bot from detection and removal; 
k – bot activity level (e.g. sniffing, spam sending, DDoS 
performing, etc.) that directly influences the efficiency of 
self-protection measures employed by the bot since the 
higher is the bot activity level, the higher is probability that 
it is noticed and removed. k is calculated:














= ⋅∑∑  (4)
is the summary of time consumption of strategy S in the 
evaluated time period T; ti – time consumption of a spe-
cific method (j – the gene’s index; i – the method’s index 
of the jth gene); CPU_LOADi – average method’s load on 
CPU of the infected computer during time ti. CPU load is 
selected as one of the most descriptive computer process 
activity parameters. Model limitation is introduced so that 
all computers included in the botnet run almost similar 
CPUs by the processing power.
conclusions
The botnet-oriented genetic algorithm based malware stra-
tegy evolution forecasting model was proposed, which aims 
at forecasting botnet survivability mechanism evolution 
forecasting and may be used as a framework for forecasting 
the evolution of other botnet characteristics. The model 
consists of the structure representing propagation strategy, 
the genetic algorithm acting under specified conditions and 
a fitness function for botnet survivability mechanism stra-
tegy evaluation. Due to a lack of statistical data, the model 
is provided as a proof-of-concept with no real data tests. 
The model can be extended or adapted for other malware 
types or characteristic evolution modelling.
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KEnKėjIšKų Botnet TInKLų IšgyvEnAMuMo 
MEchAnIzMų EvoLIucIjoS PRognozAvIMAS 
gEnETInIo ALgoRITMo PRIEMonėMIS
n. goranin, A. Čenys, j. juknius
Santrauka
Botnet tinklai pripažįstami kaip vieni pavojingiausių šiuolaikinių 
kenksmingų programų ir vertinami kaip viena iš didžiausių 
grėsmių tarptautinei IT infrastruktūrai. Botnet tinklai greitai evo-
liucionuoja, todėl jų savisaugos mechanizmų evoliucijos progno-
zavimas yra svarbus planuojant ir kuriant kontrpriemones. Šiame 
straipsnyje pateikiamas genetiniu algoritmu pagrįstas modelis, 
skirtas Botnet tinklų savisaugos mechanizmų evoliucijai prog-
nozuoti, kuris taip pat gali būti naudojamas kaip pagrindas kitų 
Botnet tinklų savybių evoliucijai modeliuoti. Skirtingi savisaugos 
mechanizmai vertinami taikant siūlomą tinkamumo funkciją.
Reikšminiai žodžiai: Botnet, genetinis algoritmas, prognozė, 
savisauga, evoliucija, modelis.
